dangerous intrusions
6 into the body of an individual presumed innocent by the very criminal justice system seeking to "break into the privacy" 7 of his physical being. The uniquely intrusive nature of surgical searches is itself ample support for serious reflection by the legal system. The need for such reflection is enhanced when the issue of surgical searches is placed within the context of the expansive ambit of permissible, reasonable searches currently allowed under the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court has let stand, in the face of fourth amendment challenges, the following types of searches: stop-and-frisk searches; 8 wiretapping; 9 recorded eavesdropping; 10 monitoring personal use of a private telephone;" use of electronic tracking devices (viz. "beepers");' 2 handwriting exemplars; t3 voice exemplars;' 4 scrapant's consent. The constitutional problem would differ considerably from the one addressed here should the situation involve a defendant who initially consents to a surgical search, objecting only after the bullet is removed. Such a subsequent constitutional challenge would most likely be directed to the constitutionality of the consent. In all likelihood, the challenge would be predicated on an alleged violation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment procedural due process rights rather than on an alleged violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
5 Surgeries clearly vary in the level of pain experienced by the patient. In this context, the reader should note that pain is associated with surgeries performed under local anesthesia. See, e.g., Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 905 (4th Cir. 1983) (Widener, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 Ct. (1984 ; United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 321 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Robinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977) . 6 The fourth amendment bright line regulating surgical searches is grounded in judicial concern about the differences in the extent of bodily intrusion and any resultant differential risk between surgical removal of bullets under local anesthetic and surgical removal under general anesthetic. 10 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750 (1979) (finding no fourth amendment violation where conversations were intercepted by and recorded from radio transmitter worn by IRS agent proceeding in violation of IRS policy regarding eavesdropping); White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (holding no fourth amendment violation where conversations were intercepted by and recorded from radio transmitter worn by law enforcement agent proceeding in absence of warrant).
I See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding warrantless use of pen-register, a monitoring device attached to telephone line that records numbers of all outgoing calls, did not constitute a search within meaning of fourth amendment and did not violate fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures).
12 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding use of electronic "beeper" tracking device to monitor movement of drum of chloroform was not a search within meaning of fourth amendment and did not violate fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures). Ct. 1974) .
Courts have simplified the complexities of anesthesia by utilizing the distinction between local and general anesthesia. This distinction may facilitate the initial framing of legal issues when they are posed by a case of first impression. In such a context, dichotomizing local and general anesthesia can be a valid point of departure. This may, however, direct attention away from other legal concerns that could be raised with respect to surgical searches. These concerns relate to (a) whether or not the legal issues vary with the use of each type of anesthesia, (b) the range of anesthesia that can be induced by both local and general anesthetics, (c) the manner of anesthetic induction, and (d) the relative risk of local and general anesthesia, an issue considered at greater length at infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Thus, it is important to be aware of distinctions that may be missed by the shorthand use of the medical terms local and general anesthesia.
Local anesthesia is anesthesia that reduces or eliminates the perception of pain without affecting consciousness. Local anesthesia is categorized as (1) local infiltration anesthesia, injection of anesthesia directly into the operative site, and (2) regional (also known as conductive) anesthesia, anesthesia affecting an entire structural-functional area of the body by injection directed to the nerve(s) serving the surgical site. Another form of local anesthesia, topical anesthesia, is inapplicable to surgical searches because it is used only to anesthetize mucous tissue, e.g., eyes, nose, throat, urethra, and is ap- Both local infiltration and regional anesthesia, by definition, desensitize the area surrounding the site of surgery. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.26. Both local infiltration and regional anesthesia are induced by pharmacological local anesthetics. R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § § 58.51(1)-.51(3b); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § § 25.28-.31. There are, however, significant differences between local infiltration and regional anesthesia in the mode of induction and in the types of operations that can be performed under each. To illustrate, local infiltration use of local anesthesia desensitizes the peripheral nerves of only a delimited area of the body and is induced by a direct injection into and around the surgical site. R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.5 1(1); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.28. Regional use of local anesthesia desensitizes a much larger area of the body, however, the entire area served by the nerve(s) selected for desensitization. This type of local anesthesia is delivered by an injection: (1) at the base of the nerve(s) to be desensitized; (2) into the epidural space; The second mode of induction is by injection of local anesthesia into the cerebrospinal fluid so that nerves are affected at the point of exiting the spinal cord. Local anesthesia, used as spinal anesthesia, can, depending on concentration, affect all nerve groups below the diaphragm and above the sacrum (the large bone at the base of the spine). R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at ch.18; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.51(3b); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.30. In addition, spinal use of local anesthesia affects the autonomic nervous system, the nervous system that is involved in regulating the heart, blood pressure, respiration, body temperature, the so-called fight-or-flight response, and behavior and emotional functioning.
Although all of the above-outlined anesthetic procedures deliver local anesthesia and affect only certain areas of the body, there are major differences between local infiltration and regional anesthesia. Thus, under regional, but not local infiltration, local anesthesia, major surgical procedures can be performed, such as a full range of abdominal surgeries. R. GRAY & L. GORDv, supra, at § 58.51(3); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.31.
The legal concept of major and minor bodily intrusions, employed to distinguish between surgical searches performed under general and local anesthesia, obscures legal cognizance of the extent of bodily intrusions possible under local anesthesia. see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (leaving open question whether "fear," "health," or "religious scruples" might render a minor procedure too intrusive); see also infra notes 23-62 and accompanying text. It is clear that both major and minor intrusions can and do occur under local anesthesia. See infra notes 107-120 and accompanying text.
The same blurring of legally significant distinctions occurs in the undifferentiated use of the term general anesthesia by courts considering surgical search cases. Such undifferentiated use focuses attention on the perceived life-threatening dangers of unconsciousness induced by general anesthesia, obscuring the medical fact that there are degrees of surgical unconsciousness, only two of which pose the life-threatening dangers usually evoked by the term general anesthesia. See R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF § 58.52. Indeed, use of general anesthesia for minor surgery facilitates the surgery and minimizes the damage to nerves, muscles, and blood vessels. This is the case because of the body's relaxed state under general anesthesia, which permits the surgeon to move these structures out-of the way rather than cut through them, as would be the case with local anesthesia. See infra note 84.
The conclusion is that the use of local versus general anesthesia does not necessarily identify minor versus major bodily intrusions and, hence, is not a legally valid system of categorizing such intrusions. Yet, the courts hearing surgical search cases have made such an identification, obscuring the central legal issue of when a surgical search ceases to be reasonable. See infra notes 44, 66 and accompanying text.
Some surgical searches may be reasonable under the fourth amendment. See infra notes 107-120 and accompanying text. If a surgical search ceases to be reasonable when the bodily intrusion entailed in the search is major, such an intrusion cannot be measured by the type of anesthesia to be utilized because major intrusions can occur with certain uses of local anesthesia as well as with the use of general anesthesia. Thus, if the use of general anesthesia is to function as the bright line separating reasonable from unreasonable searches, its underlying rationale cannot be wedded to the extent and associated risks of the bodily intrusion.
A final point, considered more fully at infra note 83, is the relative risk associated
Winston, 22 the most recent appellate court decision drawing the bright line against the use of general anesthesia to perform a surgical search. In examining the development of the bright line prohibition of general anesthesia in surgical search cases, this Article will examine the principal legal rationales supporting this prohibition. Closing remarks will articulate proposed rules applicable to the fourth amendment analysis of the use of both general and local anesthetic surgical searches.
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE ROCHIN AND SCHMERBER
STANDARDS
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of surgical searches. In Rochin v. California 23 and Schmerber v. California, 24 however, the Court did address the constitutionality of bodily intrusive searches conducted to secure evidence for subsequent prosecutions. In Rochin, 2 5 the Court held that pumping the stomach of the defendant without his consent, in order to recover swallowed evidence, was an unconstitutional bodily intrusion. 26 In Schmerber, 27 the Court found the challenged bodily intruwith local and general anesthesia. Medically, risk is associated with the condition of the patient, not with the principal anesthesia employed-local or general. The healthier the patient, the lower the risk, regardless of the use of general or local anesthesia. R. 26 Rochin was decided on fourteenth amendment procedural due process grounds, rather than on fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure grounds. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-69, 174. The Rochin decision was rendered before the fourth amendment had been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 26-27 (1949) . Even though the standard of review applied in Rochin was the "concept of ordered liberty," Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) ), the :'shocks the conscience" and "rack and screw" approach, see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, has been converted into a standard of review by many of the courts hearing cases on surgical searches that have been challenged as unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983) 459, 460 (1982) .
27 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757. 28 In Schmerber, defendant-appellant Schmerber, along with a companion, had been drinking at a "tavern and bowling alley." Upon leaving, Schmerber and his companion got into a car with Schmerber driving. The automobile "skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree." Id. at 758 n.2. Schmerber was taken to a hospital and treated for injuries sustained in the accident.
A policeman who investigated the accident both at the scene and at the hospital later testified that Schmerber's breath smelled of alcohol and that his eyes "were 'bloodshot, watery, sort of glassy in appearance.'" Id. at 768-69. The officer arrested Schmerber at the hospital and ordered the attending physician to withdraw blood for analysis of its blood-alcohol content. Id. at 758. Schmerber did not consent to the blood test. The subsequent blood analysis indicated that Schmerber was intoxicated at the time of the accident. A report of the analysis was admitted into evidence at Schmerber's trial. Id. at 759.
29 The defendant-appellant in Schmerber claimed four specific constitutional violations: procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment; self-incrimination under the fifth amendment; right to counsel under the sixth amendment; and unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. The Court held that the involuntary withdrawal of Schmerber's blood in order to ascertain its blood-alcohol content was permissible under each of the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated. Id. at 771-72. The Court's holding on the search and seizure claim is of principal significance because it formulated the basic structure of what has become the standard of review for surgical searches. See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 899, 901; Crowder, 543 F.2d The Schmerber Court defined a minor bodily intrusion as one that "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. A minor bodily intrusion must be performed "by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices." Id. The Court clearly identified the circumstances that would justify a minor bodily intrusive search: there must be "a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence will be found." Id. at 770. The Court closed its opinion with an affirmation of the value accorded by our culture to the "integrity of an individual's person," noting that its decision must not be construed as countenancing "more substantial intrusions or intrusions under other conditions." Id. 33 See Lee 11, 717 F.2d at 901 ("the procedure contemplated is more akin to the impermissible activity of Rochin than to the minor intrusion in Schmerber. In short '[t] hese are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.' ") (quoting Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at 261); Adams, 260 Ind. at 666, 299 N.E.2d at 836 (court found Rochin opinion controlling); Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914 ("the use of the surgical knife to the extent indicated in this case is offensive to the sense of fair play and decency and the American way of life").
34 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316. The court in Crowder explicitly rejected the Rochin standard, adopting the basic Schmerber standard but incorporating additional safeguards. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
It is important to note that the Crowder opinion substantially expanded the procedural requirements established by the Supreme Court in Schmerber to secure a surgical search. The court in Crowder required an adversarial hearing on the propriety of the surgical search itself and appellate review prior to execution of the surgical search. Doe, 409 So. 2d at 27 (court, applying Schmerber and also citing Crowder, held "mere chance" of bullet's evidentiary value rendered search unreasonable); Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (court, applying Schmerber standard, held proposed surgical search of first defendant unreasonable under fourth amendment because it "involv[ed] a substantial intrusion into his body and risk to his health, safety or life" and upheld proposed surgical search of second defendant as minor bodily intrusion).
35 See Bowden, 256 Ark. at 823-24, 510 S.W.2d at 881 ("the proposed operation constitutes medically a major intrusion into petitioner's body involving trauma, pain and possible risk of life even when performed in a proper medical environment with the most careful and skilled attention"); Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 626-27 (judicial delegation of determination of reasonableness to surgeon evaluating risks fails Schmerber test); Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (major surgery for bullet removal "involving a substantial intrusion into [defendant's] body and risk to his health, safety or life" fails Schmerber test).
its standard of review, 3 6 held that the legally unauthorized 3 7 pumping of the defendant-appellant's stomach constituted conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
38
The ideas expressed in this passage have been employed as a standard by courts hearing or reviewing surgical searches. 3 9 Rochin and its language have expressly been invoked by all courts holding surgical searches unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
40
The Court, in its Schmerber opinion, utilized different language to validate the bodily intrusion caused by an involuntarily administered blood test. The Schmerber decision focused less on the circumstances of the bodily intrusion, as was the case in Rochin, and more on the impact of the intrusion on the defendant. The Court held that a blood test constituted a reasonable search under the fourth amendment because it was a minor bodily intrusion "involv [ing] 41 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Schmerber Court construed the challenged blood test as a minor bodily intrusion based on the application of the following two-step standard of review: (1) justification considered in terms of a clear indication that specific, desired evidence is contained within the body; and (2) by permitting bodily intrusive searches that, by definition, violate the body's sanctity. This dilemma is framed even more starkly by surgical searches.
Surgical searches are per se intrusive. The functional nature of the surgical scalpel is to intrude, by incision, into the body. It does so whatever its articulated purpose-to heal or to seek evidence of guilt. And, although its intrusive nature may be mitigated by the consent of the patient or judicial supervision, it remains intrusive. 44 The sanctity of the body, however, is not the only value to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of bodily intrusive searches. The Supreme Court, in both Rochin and Schmerber, recognized that the sanctity of the body is not absolute. 4 5 In each opinion, the Court impliedly acknowledged that the defendant's interest in the sanctity of his body, as well as his interest in controlling the presentation of and access to his body, may be required to yield before society's interest in seeking and securing the evidence necessary to prosecute criminal offenses against it. 46 The same balancing process employed by the Supreme Court in Rochin and Schmerber is embodied in the standards of review that have evolved from these opinions. The interest of the defendant in the sanctity of his body is controlling where a bodily intrusive search "shocks the conscience" or where it constitutes a major intrusion in terms of the extent of risk, trauma, and pain accompanying the search. 4 7 The interest of society in vigorous law enforcement is controlling where the search constitutes a minor bodily intrusion. 4 The "shocks the conscience" standard of Rochin focuses on the improper methods employed to implement a bodily intrusive search. In Rochin, an otherwise minor medical procedure, pumping a stomach, 4 9 is constitutionally invalid because of the impropriety of the procedures utilized by law enforcement personnel to secure the evidence. 5 0 The Rochin standard for invalidating bodily intrusive searches is thus a procedural standard. 5 ' On the other hand, the Schmerber minor intrusion standard goes beyond the law enforcement procedures utilized in any given bodily intrusive search to an examination of the medically assessed risk of such a search as defined by the medical procedures involved. two distinct standards of review for addressing two distinct problems raised by bodily intrusive searches: first, the constitutionality of the law enforcement procedures utilized to conduct such searches; and second, the constitutionality of a specific bodily invasion as determined by the medical procedures required for its performance. And because Rochin and Schmerber are the only Supreme Court decisions on the subject of bodily intrusive searches, 5 4 courts considering the fourth amendment reasonableness of surgical searches have invoked these opinions, fashioning them into standards of review. In the process, the original distinction between the Rochin and Schmerber opinions-law enforcement procedure, on the one hand, medical procedure, on the other-has faded. This consequence is due to a shift in the perceived legal question. For the Supreme Court in Rochin and Schmerber, the perceived legal question was the constitutionality of involuntary bodily intrusions. 5 5 The nature of this question required the Court to scrutinize both legal and medical procedures. In doing so, the Court applied differing standards of review to procedural matters it viewed as distinct-legal procedures, on the one hand; medical procedures, on the other.
For contemporary courts considering the reasonableness of surgical searches, the perceived legal question has changed. The issue has become the constitutionality of a specific type of bodily intrusive search-the surgical search. Thus, a central focus of the Schmerber Court, the reasonableness of medical procedures utilized in bodily intrusive searches, has become paramount to courts considering the reasonableness of surgical searches. And of all the medical procedures implicated in surgical searches, those related to anesthesia receive the most attention. These courts have come to view questions of anesthesia as central and, perhaps, dispositive of the reasonableness of surgical searches. In this regard, the original focus of Rochin, the constitutionality of procedures followed by law enforcement personnel, has become less and less prominent. Rochin, however, does retain vitality with respect to surgical search cases because of its clear insistence that the dignity of the defend- ant's body merits constitutional recognition and protection. 5 6 Courts considering the reasonableness of surgical searches have converged in holding surgical searches reasonable when performed with local anesthesia under the minor intrusion rationale of Schmerber. 5 7 By a similar convergence, surgical searches requiring general anesthesia are held unreasonable because they violate the "shocks the conscience" rationale of Rochin, 58 because they constitute major intrusions under Schmerber, 59 or because they violate both rationales.
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This judicial consensus appears to be approaching promulgation of a per se rule against those surgical searches requiring general anesthesia. See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316 (upholding as minor intrusion surgical search under local anesthetic for bullet lodged in defendant's forearm but disallowing surgical search for bullet lodged in thigh as major intrusion because of possibility of permanent injury); Hughes, 429 A.2d at 1340 & n.2 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search using local anesthesia); Doe, 409 So. 2d at 28 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search using local anesthesia); Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514, 192 S.E.2d at 353 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search using local anesthesia) ; Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at 557-58 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search for bullet using local anesthesia); Allen, 277 S.C. at 602-03, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (permitting surgical search performed under local anesthesia as to first defendant as minor intrusion, but denying as major intrusion surgical search of second defendant requiring general anesthesia and considered by two surgeons to be major surgical procedure). But see Crowder, J., dissenting The federal district court initially granted the state's request for the surgical search, applying the Schmerber standard of review and finding that the state had complied with each element of the standard. 6 6 The federal district court found that the proposed surgical search, to be performed under local anesthetic, constituted a minor intrusion with virtually no risk of harm. 67 Shortly after the opinion ordering the surgical search was rendered, but prior to the surgical search, Lee sought another hearing in federal district court concerning the reasonableness of the search on the basis of changed circumstances.
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The changed circumstances concerned reassessment of the medical procedures necessary to remove the bullet. A more thorough medical evaluation indicated that surgical removal of the bullet would require general anesthesia. 6 9 In its reassessment, the district court noted that the surgery would entail a more substantial medical undertaking. 70 Medical testimony indicated that the use of general anesthesia also increased the risk of the proposed surgical search to the defendant. 7 1 Upon consideration of the evidence supporting Lee's assertion of changed circumstances, the district court reversed its earlier decision and held the proposed surgical search 67 Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 251-52. Specifically, the court noted: (a) the bullet was lodged superficially, 0.5 centimeters below the surface of the skin; (b) the examining physician estimated the risk of harm associated with the removal of the bullet as "one in 10,000 or one in 100,000"; and (c) removal of the bullet could be accomplished under local anesthetic. Id. [Vol. 75 unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 72 The most significant aspect of the district court's second opinion was its abandonment of the Schmerber standard and adoption of the Rochin standard in determining the reasonableness of a search under the fourth amendment. 73 Specifically, the court noted that "the reasonableness of an intrusion turns on the degree and manner of its interference with a person's privacy and dignity." '74 The court invoked the language of Rochin, pointing out that "the fact that general anesthetic is involved is very important to the Court's conclusion that the procedures shock the conscience." The district court, in adopting the Rochin standard as controlling, suggested that the medico-legal standard of Schmerber 76 was not the proper standard for assessing the fourth amendment reasonableness of surgical searches. Judge Merhige stated that "whether or not a surgeon would characterize the [surgical] procedure as 'minor surgery' is of no moment; there is no reason to suppose that the definition of a medical term of art should coincide with the parameters of a constitutional standard." ' 7 7 By rejecting Schmerber and grounding its holding on the Rochin standard, the district court appeared to be seeking a purely legal standard upon which to base its decision that the proposed surgical search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
72 Id. at 261. 73 Id. at 260-61. 74 Id. at 260. 75 Id. at 261. 76 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 77 Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 260. Judge Merhige came close to specifying the central flaw of the major-minor distinction enunciated in Schmerber. The flaw is simply that the extent of the bodily intrusion in a surgical search does not vary necessarily or in practice with the anesthesia employed. Thus, as outlined at supra note 21, major surgical procedures, which surely are tantamount to major bodily intrusions, occur under local as well as general anesthesia. Conversely, minor surgical procedures, viz. minor bodily intrusions, occur under general as well as local anesthesia.
These points illustrate the difficulty of framing a legal standard for surgical searches on the basis of medical criteria. Courts passing on surgical search cases clearly are attempting to limit such searches to minor bodily intrusions, viz. minor surgical procedures. But they proceed to measure the miner nature of the intrusion by a medical procedure-use of local rather than general anesthesia-that bears no necessary correlation in theory or in practice to what the courts are trying to measure.
If general anesthesia is beyond the limit of reasonableness under the fourth amendment, the authors suggest that it is because there is something in the nature of general anesthesia that offends the value placed by our sociocultural system on the individual, a value built into and protected by our legal establishment through the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
B. APPELLATE DECISION
The state appealed the second decision of the district court to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 78 The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the district court decision.
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The appellate court's analysis of the fourth amendment reasonableness issue raised by the proposed surgical search illustrates the difficulty a court encounters in deciding which standard, Rochin or Schmerber, is controlling. Is a general anesthetic surgical search unreasonable because it constitutes major bodily intrusion, defined principally by medical criteria, thereby contravening the Schmerber minor intrusion standard? Or, is a general anesthetic surgical search unreasonable, as the district court found, because rendering a person, who is presumed innocent, unconscious against his will for the purpose of probing into bodily tissues for evidence is a scenario that "shocks the conscience" because it comes "too close to the rack and screw" to pass constitutional muster under the Rochin standard? 80 Reflective of this difficulty in determining exactly why a general anesthetic surgical search is unreasonable, the appellate court found both standards to have been violated. 8 ' The problems inherent in returning to the medico-legal standards of reasonableness entailed in the Schmerber standard, however, were catalogued at length by Judge Widener in his dissent. The Commonwealth proposes to forcibly subdue petitioner by injection, make a substantial incision into his body, retract muscle tissue in an attempt to locate the subject bullet, and if successful in locating it, extract it from his body. . . . In short, " [t] hese are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Id. (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
81 Lee 1I, 717 F.2d at 901. Thus, the majority noted, "[tihe task here, in assessing the state's request to proceed with the surgery, is therefore to determine whether this is a minor intrusion permissible under Schmerber or whether it is beyond the pale of permissible police intrusions and thus condemned by Rochin." Id. at 900. The majority concluded: "'Considering the scope of the intrusion, the risks involved, and the affront to petitioner's dignity,. . . the procedure contemplated is more akin to the impermissible activity in Rochin than to the minor intrusion in Schmerber. "These are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."' " Id. at . Judge Widener appears to be medically correct in this regard. Whether or not an operation will proceed under local or general anesthesia is not the determining factor in evaluating the potential risk of harm to the patient. The evaluation depends upon "the careful investigation of the patient's physiological status in order to delineate any deviations from the normal that may exist as a result of disease. Pre-anesthetic evaluation begins with the review of the patient's medical history, physical examination findings, and laboratory data." See R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra note 21, at § 58.10. Risk associated specifically with the use of anesthesia (as distinguished from risk associated with the surgical procedure itself) is correlated positively with the physiological status of the patient. The healthier and, usually, the younger the patient, the less risk of harm is associated with the use of anesthesia, local or general. R. DaiPps,J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAm, supra note'21, at 14-15; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra note 21, at § 58.13. See also Lee II, 717 F.2d at 906.
Medically, the risk of major or minor bodily intrusions resulting from major or minor surgery is an issue separate and distinct from the use of general or local anesthesia. By attempting to correlate the extent of a surgical search with type of anesthesia, the courts have tried to articulate a standard of reasonableness predicated upon medical knowledge and practice while refusing to recognize that anesthesia and extent of bodily intrusion are not related in any legally meaningful way. At the same time, a crucial issue in surgical searches has been obscured. The issue is simply this: reasonableness in medical terms is not reasonableness in legal terms; specifically, it is not reasonableness in terms of the fourth amendment. Thus, the use of general anesthesia in conducting surgical searches may be a major bodily intrusion. If it is, it is not because use of general anesthesia represents a major bodily intrusion with all the attendant surgical risks. It is because general anesthesia offends the dignity and privacy of the defendant's person. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
84 Citing the testimony of two surgeons, the dissent noted:
[Tihe proposed surgery would be less risky and involve fewer complications under general anesthesia because it would proceed more smoothly. . . .
[U]nder general anesthesia the patient's muscles are more relaxed and the patient experiences less pain. Under local anesthesia the muscles would contract when the patient felt pain, making extraction of the bullet and any fragments more difficult. overall risk under local anesthesia, 8 5 then the Schmerber standard would be satisfied and the search would be reasonable.
This innocuous result can be avoided only if the issue is viewed in different terms. Instead of examining the issue of the reasonableness of the surgical search in terms of the comparative medical risks between local and general anesthesia, it could be examined in terms of the physical, indeed mental, invasion of a presumptively innocent person. By examining the issue in this manner, a legal analysis employing a legal standard is required, rather than a Schmerber medicolegal standard supported by an analysis predicated as much on current medical state of the art as on legal standards and analyses. Thus, where the question is one of rendering a presumptively innocent person involuntarily unconscious in order to probe his body to whatever depth necessary to secure a bullet that may or may not be evidence at trial, the Rochin standard controls. Rochin controls because it is predicated upon certain American values embodied in our Constitution. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures as applied to surgical searches through the Rochin standard recognizes that surgery performed under general anesthesia, no matter how safe in Schmerber terms, on a presumptively innocent, involuntarily unconscious person "shocks the conscience" of a free society.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is eloquent testimony to the value accorded to the person. The fourth amendment stands for the proposition that in a free society, the prosecution of those alleged to have committed criminal offenses must be satisfied by methods more consistent with the value this country and its legal system places on the integrity of the individual both in his body and his spirit. For two reasons, rendering a defendant unconscious is not one of these methods. First, insofar as consciousness-that is, an awareness of self and of one's surroundings, the capacity to consider various courses of action and to choose among them, the capacity to think, believe, feel, and judge-is definitive of being human, the involuntary termination of 85 Drawing on testimony of an anesthesiologist, a professor emeritus of anesthesiology, and a physician with extensive experience in the surgical removal of bullets, the dissent pointed out that Lee was in the lowest risk category of persons who might receive general anesthetic. Id. at 907 (Widener,J., dissenting). The anesthesiologist testified that the risk of harm to Lee in surgically removing the bullet under local anesthetic was one in 50,000. Id. (Widener, J., dissenting). But in further testimony, the anesthesiologist stated that "for a given type of patient and surgery, assuming the involvement of a competent anesthesiologist, the risk of injury, whether temporary or permanent, or of death is the same for local and general anesthesia." Id. (Widener, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 75 consciousness by general anesthesia is a clear affront to the essence of the defendant's humanity. Involuntary unconsciousness stands in opposition to the value accorded to the physical and mental integrity of the individual.
The second reason concerns privacy. Privacy stands as a sentinel to the physical and mental integrity of the individual. A domain of privacy 8 6 stands between the individual as a private person and the individual as a public person sharing the world with others. It serves as a reminder that the individual is something beyond his membership in the social whole.
The fourth amendment recognizes this domain of privacy by excluding from exposure to public view, through the actions of law enforcement personnel, one's person, home, papers, and effects absent a public need to intrude conceptualized as probable cause. The fourth amendment also protects areas of privacy based upon an individual's expectation of privacy within such areas. 8 8 If the fourth amendment protects the privacy of the individual with respect to his physical person, 9 to a sphere of private activity, 9 0 and to zones of privacy defined by an expectation of privacy, 9 1 it surely protects the privacy of his inner person. Thus, the fourth amendment protects the inner physical and mental person from an involuntary surgical invasion inducing a loss of consciousness-a general anesthetic surgical search. This conclusion is supported by the fact that reasonable searches under the fourth amendment typically are carried out with the full awareness of the person subject to the search. 9 2 Thus, the person to be searched is aware of the manner by which the 27-28 (1949) .
87 For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 3. 88 See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984) search is conducted. Within this context, a general anesthetic surgical search is anomalous. It is a dual invasion of privacy not contemplated by the fourth amendment. The individual who is surgically searched is not aware, nor can he be, of the actual conduct of the search. He does not know, nor can he know, whether or not the extent of the surgical intrusion has become greater than he was told. He does not know, nor can he know, whether or not the physical or mental surgical risk to him has increased as the surgical search has progressed. Unlike other searches, the general anesthesic surgical search entails an invasion of a defendant's inner physical being as well as an invasion of the definitive component of his mental being-his consciousness. Such a dual affront to the individual would seem to be precluded by the value accorded to that individual as guarded by a zone of privacy recognized and protected by the fourth amendment.
The central issue is not, therefore, the extent of a surgical search as a physical intrusion. Rather, the dispositive issue is the manner in which the surgical search is conducted and its necessary result-intrusion into both physical and mental zones of privacy. Surgical searches conducted under general anesthesia, regardless of whether the surgery contemplated constitutes a major or minor intrusion, offend the fourth amendment.
It is this analysis of the fourth amendment, compounded by doubt about the probative value of the bullet and the presumption of innocence, that Judge Merhige, presiding in the Lee trial court, embraced when he found the proposed general anesthetic surgical search unreasonable. 9 4 It is against this same background that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the proposed surgical search an " 'affront to petitioner's dignity.' "-5 It is, we suggest, what the Supreme Court meant in its Rochin opinion when it stated that certain invasions of the individual "shock the conscience," being "too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional Another exception is the drawing of blood from an unconscious driver in order to determine its blood-alcohol content. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957) .
93 Local anesthetic surgical searches are somewhat analogous to the more typical searches conducted pursuant to the fourth amendment. These searches do not involve the dual personal invasion of general anesthetic searches. With local anesthetic searches, the defendant is aware both of the proposed search and the actual conduct of the search. There is an uncontroverted invasion of the defendant's physical being and, hence, of his inner physical privacy. There is, however, no further invasion of his privacy. There is no attack on his mental privacy through a taking of his consciousness by the administration of general anesthesia. The Lee majority's invocation of the Rochin standard in further support of its decision, however, suggests a certain awareness that the Schmerber standard alone could not support the use of general anesthesia as the bright line separating reasonable from unreasonable surgical searches. Perhaps this explains why the Lee majority did not respond to the dissent's application of the Schmerber standard as the reason for urging a factual finding that the proposed search would be unreasonable.
7
An analysis of the Lee decision points up the dilemma of Schmerber and the fourth amendment significance of Rochin. The minor intrusion of Schmerber is defined, in part, in terms of risk of harm. 98 The use of general anesthesia may constitute a major or minor intrusion and, hence, an unreasonable or a reasonable search, depending upon the medical expertise available to control the risk of harm. 9 9 But if the use of general anesthesia is construed as per se violative of the integrity of the person, a construction clearly consistent with the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, it would remain so regardless of risk of harm, minimal though such risk may be from the medical point of view. 10 0
The Lee decision appears to have established, at least within the Fourth Circuit, that use of general anesthesia constitutes the bright line between reasonable and unreasonable surgical searches.' 0 ' In support of its decision, the Lee majority invoked the Schmerber standard as the principal basis of its decision, 0 2 with reinforcement 101 The dissent viewed the majority's opinion as going beyond establishing a bright line separating reasonable and unreasonable searches. The dissent construed the opinion as establishing a per se unreasonable rule against general anesthetic surgical searches. Id. at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
102
The court found that " [t] he basic principle is that, once the state has demonstrated the relevancy of evidence and the inability to obtain it otherwise, the reasonableness of removing it forcibly from a person's body is judged by the extent of the surgical intru-drawn from the Rochin standard.' 0 3 But as noted above, it is the reliance on the Schmerber standard that weakens the Lee decision.' 0 4
The Schmerber standard is a contingent standard-contingent upon medical advances that may reduce the risk of harm associated with general anesthesia such that the minor intrusion linchpin of the standard is met. Any bright line constructed on a contingent standard is vulnerable to erosion.
The failure of the Lee majority to ground its decision on the Rochin standard opens it to challenge as soon as prosecutors are able to prove that the medical risk of general anesthesia is on a par with that of local anesthesia generally, or at least with respect to a particular suspect. Thus, if the Lee decision is to become the basis for vindicating the value accorded by the fourth amendment to the integrity of the person, two further steps are required. The first step is an articulation of a per se rule that general anesthetic surgical searches are unreasonable under the fourth amendment and the Rochin rationale. The second step is an articulation of a rebuttable presumption that local anesthetic surgical searches are per se unreasonable based on Schmerber as expanded by United States v. Crowder.1 0 5 The integrity of the person remains a fourth amendment concern even when a proposed surgical search is to be performed under local anesthesia. Because local anesthetic surgeries are not necessarily minimal bodily intrusions, the exact character of a proposed local anesthetic surgical search merits greater scrutiny by the courts than has been extended heretofore. 
IV. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING SURGICAL SEARCHES
A. GENERAL ANESTHETIC SURGICAL SEARCHES
This review of the surgical search cases indicates that courts have determined fourth amendment reasonableness in terms of the type of anesthesia, local or general, required to perform the sion and the extent of the risks to the subject." Id. at 899. See also United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976 4367 (1985) . The Court employed its Schmerber framework in balancing the disputed medical risks to Lee and the intrusion on his privacy interests against the absence of a compelling need on the part of the state to use the bullet as evidence. Id. at 4368-70. The Supreme Court held the proposed search unreasonable under the fourth amendment and affirmed the appellate decision. search. 1 0 7 No court to date has permitted a surgical search requiring general anesthesia.' 0 8 Thus, a fair conclusion to draw is that the courts have fashioned a de facto per se rule against general anesthesia. This conclusion is warranted particularly in the Fourth Circuit as a consequence of the Lee decision. 10 9
The rationale for the rule against the use of general anesthesia in surgical searches is critical. The rationale chosen must be able to resist such factual proof as would render a general anesthetic surgical search reasonable in the opinion of reviewing courts. Indeed, it must be one that precludes general anesthetic surgical searches as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact. The Schmerber standard, by tying the determination of reasonableness to medical technology, renders a matter-of-fact rationale. 1 10 As such, it simply postpones the time at which general anesthetic surgical searches, as a matter of fact, become safe enough to fall on the minor intrusion side of the major-minor dichotomy drawn by the Schmerber Court."'
The Supreme Court itself has resisted, on various occasions, the efforts of appellate litigators to wed legal principles to matters of fact resolved not by law, but rather by facts and their interpretation drawn from nonlegal disciplines. 1 12 Where the Court has not resisted these attempts, the outcome has been confusion over the independent validity of the resulting legal principles when new evidence is later generated by nonlegal sources that can undermine the very legal principles that such evidence originally was used to establish.' '1
Illustrative of this tension between legal principles and the threat of their erosion by nonlegal evidence are the Court's decisions in the area of abortion. The promulgation of dependent legal principles-principles built with one foot in the law and one foot in medicine, the social sciences, engineering, or some other nonlegal domain-generates uncertainty and confusion. Legal principles and their measuring standards ought to change primarily as a consequence of the need to apply them to changed circumstances, arising within the sociocultural system and presented to the courts by the vehicle of litigation. As mediator of litigious disputes precipitated by extralegal changes, the judiciary proceeds by applying principles and standards independent of the factual positions it must adjudicate. The law, as promulgated by the judiciary, is accepted and implemented because it is derived from legal principles and standards, rather than from a skillful but partisan edifice of legal principles and standards generated by legal advocates to reflect the most recent nonlegal state of knowledge or of art.
The significance of independent legal resolutions to legal issues seems clear. As applied to surgical search cases, general anesthetic surgical searches are unreasonable on the basis of legal principles and standards, rather than on the basis of contemporary or anticipated medical knowledge and technology. Regardless of how safe such searches are or come to be, the fact that presumptively innocent persons can be rendered involuntarily unconscious to undergo surgery that will facilitate the government's search for evidence, the probative value of which remains to be determined definitively, will not cease to breach the integrity of the person, offending the fourth amendment per se and the principles of liberty upon which the fourth amendment is based. The Rochin Standard is a defensible, independent constitutional rationale that is available to support conversion of the prevailing de facto per se rule against general anesthetic surgical searches into a de jure per se rule.
B. LOCAL ANESTHETIC SURGICAL SEARCHES
Local anesthetic surgical searches are not free from concern regarding their reasonableness under the fourth amendment. The Crowder test,"1 8 which builds upon the Schmerber standard and has at 2496, thus expanding the right. The other line of medical authority has established an earlier point of fetal viability, see id. at 2507 & n.5 (O'Connor,J., dissenting), thereby simultaneously contracting the right just expanded by a sister branch of the medical profession.
118 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316. The court in Crowder enunciated the following test:
( been utilized as the basis of decisions in subsequent surgical search cases," l9 indicates a commitment by the courts to closely scrutinize local anesthetic surgical searches. Because involuntary local anesthetic surgery raises some of the same problems as involuntary general anesthetic surgery-bodily intrusions performed on presumptively innocent persons-similar attention to fourth amendment safeguards appears warranted. To this end, the following revisions of the Schmerber-Crowder test are suggested: 1. Establishment of a rebuttable presumption against the reasonableness of local anesthetic surgical searches; 2. The presumption may be rebutted in an adversarial hearing where the accused is represented by counsel; 3. The bullet sought by the state must constitute necessary, not simply relevant, evidence for the prosecution of the accused; 4. The definitive element of the minor nature of the surgical search is that the bullet must be subject to safe removal under the local infiltration use of local anesthesia; 5. Once the prosecution establishes that the surgical search can be performed safely under local infiltration local anesthesia, the burden remains upon the prosecution to satisfy the court that there is no risk of harm to the accused from the surgery itself; and 6. If the state is able to rebut the presumption, appellate review shall be afforded to the accused prior to execution of the surgical search. 120 The first element of the revised Schmerber-Crowder test is new. The third element constitutes a change in the test by requiring that the bullet being sought as evidence bear a greater probative value-that it be necessary to the state's case-than has been the case to date.
The change suggested in the fourth element of the test is the most significant. It specifically precludes surgical removal of a bullet under regional local anesthesia. See supra note 21.
Major surgical procedures in terms of the extent of bodily intrusion and associated surgical risks are performed under local anesthesia employed in a regional capacity. Thus, only local infiltration local anesthesia (local anesthesia applied by injection to the peripheral nerves of a delimited surgical site) would be permitted under the revision being suggested. See LAWvER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at § 25.28. Under local infiltration local anesthesia, not only is the affected area of the body relatively small but the surgeries to be performed are limited to minor procedures involving only a su- The application of a more stringent test to proposed local anesthetic surgical searches will accord paramount importance to the value placed by the American sociocultural system, and the fourth amendment of the Constitution, on the physical and mental integrity of the person. It also recognizes the interest of society in taking effective action against the perpetrators of crime. The suggested revision of the Schmerber-Crowder test strikes a defensible balance between these two competing interests central to a free society. It places a more substantial burden of proof on the state than does the current Schmerber-Crowder test, thereby protecting the personhood of the accused. Yet it clearly acknowledges that the burdens imposed on the state can be sustained, thereby insuring that the interests of society in safety and protection from crime will be served.
V. CONCLUSION
Surgical searches, conducted under either local or general anesthesia, are inimical to values central to this country and made manifest in its legal institution through the Constitution. Fostering these values while protecting others requires a revision of the prevailing rules governing both types of surgical searches. This Article has proposed two such revisions. With respect to general anesthetic surgical searches, it has argued that these searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment and has suggested adoption of a de jure per se rule against such searches. With respect to local anesthetic surgical searches, this Article has suggested that a rebuttable presumption of unreasonablemaking this fact a criteria of the Schmerber-Crowder test, it will be easier to avoid any possible drift into the more extensive surgical searches that clearly can be performed under local anesthesia. See, e.g., Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506 (affirming surgical search for bullet lodged in defendant's hip four inches below surface of skin) ; Lawson, 453 A.2d at 558 (affirming surgical search for bullet located in defendant's thigh three-quarters to one inch below surface of skin).
121 These proposed rules hold significant practical consequences. First, they would simplify the decisionmaking process regarding surgical searches under either local or general anesthesia. Where expert medical testimony indicates that a surgical search can be conducted under a local infiltration use of local anesthesia, the decisionmaking process proceeds according to the revised Schmerber-Crowder test. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Where expert medical testimony indicates that a surgical search requires general anesthesia or regional use of local anesthesia, the inquiry is immediately and effectively terminated. Because the process of decision is simplified, the amount of judicial time allocated to ruling on motions to compel evidence would be minimized. Furthermore, under the rules proposed by this Article, the fourth amendment analysis and determination of any proposed surgical search will be the same in all courts regardless of the circumstances of the case beyond the type of anesthesia to be used and its mode of induction.
